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Preface 
 During the summer before my senior year of college, I stood in the kitchen of a 
Congolese refugee family while the mother made her children lunch. Her four youngest children 
ran around the apartment while she and I made small talk in broken French. We chatted about 
their new apartment, their most recent visit to the doctor, and her children’s ambitions. Towards 
the end of our casual conversation, one of her older daughters emerged from another room. The 
mother turned towards me and said, “This is Grace. She is not my husband’s.” She explained that 
a soldier had forced himself on her, and that this daughter was a result of that encounter. She told 
me that she was lucky her husband stood by her. I later learned that she and her family had been 
turned away and ostracized from their community. 
 Later that summer, when I was filling out paperwork at a doctor’s office for another 
refugee family, I had to ask the father of the family if he had ever had a job. He told me that he 
bounced around from job to job when he lived in South Kivu, but that his best job was in his 
refugee camp in Burundi. There, he was the camp’s women’s rights activist, a position appointed 
by the peacekeepers running the camp. I was a bit confused; I asked him, “Why was it you? Why 
wasn’t the women’s rights activist a woman?” He looked at me, chuckled a bit, and shrugged his 
shoulders. “I don’t know Megan. That’s just the way things are.” 
 At the end of the summer, I was working with one Congolese couple that was trying to 
adopt one of the wife’s younger sisters. Through an interpreter, we talked about their extended 
families back home. It came out during the conversation that the wife had another sister still in 
the Congo, or at least they presumed so. Before they left the country, this sister was approached 
by a rebel group and taken away. I was immediately concerned, wondering if they could be 
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reunited with this lost sister, but they told me that this was common and that I shouldn’t worry 
for them. 
  For the most part, I sat silently during these stories. Everything my clients said was so 
nonchalant, so off-handed; I could not believe they would trust me with this information. I never 
knew what to say afterwards, so I mostly said nothing, but the stories stayed in my mind. My 
heart sank throughout the summer as I continued to hear stories from both women and men about 
the atrocities and human rights abuses endured in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Most of 
the stories were told casually, with an almost blasé attitude. I was shocked that stories so horrible 
were so normalized. 
Ultimately, I wanted to live up to the trust my clients had conferred upon me and be a 
genuinely good listener. After the repeated personal stories, and my repeated inability to say 
anything productive afterwards, I began researching the Congo’s history, the contours of the 
most recent conflict and the current situation. I hoped that an understanding of the conflict would 
help me understand their stories – it didn’t. Still, I wanted to make as much of an effort at 
understanding where they came from as they had given to coming to the United States.  I knew I 
had to dig further, and thus my Honor Scholar thesis came to be.  
 I never would have gotten to this topic without the experiences of my junior year. During 
the fall of my junior year, I spent a semester abroad in Geneva, Switzerland. I took classes on 
international security and visited the plethora of international organizations headquartered there. 
I found numerous individuals and organizations that were sensitive to the connection between 
politics and the human condition, something I had not yet found at DePauw. I became interested 
in human security, generally regarded as a “softer” side of political science, and individual 
narratives of what happens in international politics. Upon my return to DePauw in the spring, I 
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took Gender and World Politics, a class in which I flourished. Each time the class met, I saw my 
research and career interests come further into focus. I loved learning about how gender plays a 
significant role in every part of world politics, especially the parts I had discussed in other 
classes where gender had never been mentioned. The change this class caused was not just 
academic, but personal; by the end of the semester I felt confident calling myself a feminist. 
With such a new interest, I knew I wanted my Honor Scholar thesis to incorporate gender, but I 
had no idea what direction it might take. 
 The final idea materialized with my previously mentioned summer internship, a 
remarkable experience guiding refugees through their first ninety days in the United States. The 
organization I interned with resettled mostly Burmese and Congolese refugees; because I speak 
some French, I was most often paired with our Congolese clients. I worked closely with these 
men, women, and children, meeting them at the airport upon their arrival in Indianapolis, 
teaching them the basics of American culture, transporting them to and from medical 
appointments, and helping them apply for Social Security numbers. I helped troubleshoot any 
misunderstanding and spent a significant amount of time with many families. Communication 
with some was easier than others – my French is really not superb – but as soon as I gained a 
little trust, my clients were open and honest with me. I heard many heartfelt stories, like the ones 
I recounted above. It feels necessary that I address where my project came from and how their 
stories have guided me to where I am today.  
 Many of the clients I worked with experienced unspeakable things. Often, the conflict in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo remains ignored by a Western audience. I believe that needs 
to change. Further, the stories made it clear that women were experiencing war in the Congo in 
unexpected ways. I had a basic understanding of gender in conflict from my Gender and World 
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Politics course, but I had almost no knowledge of the Congo and how gender or feminist theory 
could be applied there. Thus, I am using my Honor Scholar thesis to connect these two very 
personal interests: to examine women’s experiences of conflict in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. 
 By completing this project, I hope to give these women I met a voice. They should know 
that someone heard them and that someone cares. These gendered stories of conflict are not 
unique to the Democratic Republic of Congo, but they ground us in one specific example of 
women in war. Ultimately, my goal is to make sure these stories are heard and that women’s 
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Introduction 
 On October 31st 2000, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed 
Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325), a landmark resolution on women, peace, and security. UNSCR 
1325 first acknowledged that women had important roles to play, from prevention to 
peacebuilding, and urged international actors to increase women’s participation in all sectors and 
levels of peace, security, and international relations.1 Next, and perhaps more importantly, 
UNSCR 1325 finally recognized that “women [are] inordinately affected by war,” and, therefore, 
there is a need for specific programs and protections for women in conflict situations.2  With 
UNSCR 1325, the United Nations also sought to implement gender mainstreaming in their 
organizational policies. Gender mainstreaming is a broad term with a two-fold goal: first, to 
recognize how policies may affect men and women differently, and second, to incorporate the 
goal of gender equality into all United Nations work. Before, gender equality was relegated to a 
few UN agencies, namely UNIFEM, rather than tasked to all. 
The adoption of UNSCR 1325 and gender mainstreaming was a great success for civil 
society organizations, feminist activists, and a small number of UN agencies. The push for 
gender sensitive policies and programming started long before UNSCR 1325, with historical 
roots in the UN’s Decade for Women (1975-1985), Beijing’s Fourth World Conference on 
Women (1995), and other “internal action plans” for gender equality.3 All of these attempts were 
in response to widespread criticisms of the United Nations’ gender blindness. With the 
resolution’s passage, the spearheading groups felt as though their voices had finally been heard; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 U.N. Security Council, 4312th meeting, "Resolution 1325, Women, Peace and Security," 31 October 2000, official 
2 Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, “UNSCR 1325 – Conundrums and Opportunities.” International Interactions 39 (2013): 
617. 
3 Nicola Pratt and Sophie Richter-Devroe, “Critically Examining UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security,” 
International Feminist Journal of Politics 13, no. 4 (2011): 490-491. 
 
	    12 
the Security Council, the most powerful entity of the United Nations, recognized that something 
had to be done. The international community was finally going to do something about the 
gendered experience of both peace and security.  
 Effective implementation of UNSCR 1325 required great political interest, activism, and 
resources from able international players. At first, it appeared that the required political will was 
there: UNSCR 1325 was translated into hundreds of languages, and upwards of 20 countries 
drafted National Action Plans to help with more localized implementation.4 However, as often 
occurs, other global happenings quickly shifted international attention elsewhere and women, 
peace, and security efforts were left under resourced and without proper interest. Some renewed 
interest came on the resolution’s ten-year anniversary when Hillary Rodham Clinton (then 
Secretary of State) announced that the United States would create a National Action Plan.5 Still, 
even that interest did not last long enough. At all levels, the resolution has lacked political 
commitment, and thus the outcomes of UNSCR 1325 have left something to be desired. 
 The gap between UNSCR 1325’s intentions and outcomes is visible in the conflict in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. Throughout, women have been adversely and distinctively 
affected by the armed conflict. These effects are so prominent that the DRC has been repeatedly 
named the worst place in the world to be a woman. The United Nations recognizes that women 
are affected differently by war, and yet the conflict in the Congo has continued to 
disproportionately affect women even with United Nations intervention – why?  
This paper endeavors to trace women’s experiences throughout the most recent conflict in 
the Democratic Republic in the Congo, a timeframe that I will define as 1996 through 2016. 
Though gendered experiences have occurred in many facets of the conflict, I will focus on four 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Pratt and Richter-Devroe, 490-491. 
5 Oudraat, 614. 
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specific roles women play throughout the conflict: actors in early warning, victims of rape and 
sexual violence, participants in armed groups, and post-conflict peacebuilding agents. These four 
roles are in no way an exhaustive list of the positions women can hold during conflict. Quite the 
contrary, women can hold any number of roles that can change as conflict morphs and progresses. 
Instead, these four roles were chosen strategically based on a few criteria.  
First, there had to be significant literature or information available from which I could 
analyze gender specifically. This meant that feminist scholars had already addressed this role in 
conflict to some degree and that there were sources specific to women in the DRC. Second, I 
wanted my choices to offer a sampling of women’s roles at various conflict stages. Additionally, 
each role had to introduce a new way in which gender interacted with the conflict situation in the 
DRC. In particular, I wanted to move most of the roles beyond sexual violence, thus both 
broadening and deepening the gendered experience as UNSCR 1325 recognizes. Sexual violence 
is important in this conflict, but it is not the only important situation where women play a role. I 
also wanted to focus on roles organic to the Congo. Women from the international community 
have also played a role in this conflict, but they fall outside the bounds of my research. Again, 
these four roles are by no means a comprehensive list of gender in conflict; gender is very real 
even beyond conflict and often plays a role even when we do not see it.  
 To help situate these roles at various times in the conflict, I will utilize a simplified 
model of conflict stages. There are numerous models of conflict, but most include at least: no 
conflict, latent conflict, emergence, escalation, stalemate, settlement, and post-conflict efforts at 
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peacebuilding and reconciliation.6 These stages can be placed along a simple bell curve, like the 
one here.7 
 
This model is not perfect. Most conflicts do not follow a perfect curve of stages; rather, they go 
through some, repeat others, or end up in a cycle of continuous ups and downs in intensity. Some 
completely skip post-conflict peace and continue onto a new conflict altogether. However, 
conceptualizing conflict in this way helps illustrate both the basics of how conflict progresses, 
and when each of my four identified roles comes into play. Having a visual, like a curve, makes 
the progression in the DRC more understandable.    
By exploring women’s roles throughout these stages of conflict, I hope to illuminate a 
more refined understanding of what happened in the Democratic Republic of the Congo while 
also demonstrating how the gendered experience of conflict takes many forms. Much of the 
conversation about the DRC has focused on sexual violence and, while this is one very 
significant portion of the conflict, it is not the only way that gender has played a role in the 
experience of the conflict. Women’s experiences in the DRC raise questions about UNSCR 1325 
and the international community. Though this was a landmark resolution, the situation in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Eric Brahm, “Conflict Stages,” Beyond Intractability, published September 2003: 
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/conflict-stages. 
7 Ibid.	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Congo impels us to ask: did the resolution and its implementation do enough? Ultimately, there 
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Women in Conflict 
 Since the beginning of conflict, study of war, international relations, etc. has been 
“dominated” by men.8 Interstate war, or traditional war, controlled the conversation with a focus 
on state security and military strength. The analysis of traditional war focused on men and their 
armies, implying that men’s experiences were the only significant experiences. Men were 
soldiers, politicians, peacebuilders, and everything in between; women were unimportant 
bystanders. In short, the entire field of international relations was androcentric. In the post-Cold 
War era, a new international paradigm appeared: new war. New war was not just a new way to 
analyze war, but instead a label for a different kind of warfare. Unlike old war, new war is fought 
by both state and non-state actors, and does not take place on a battlefield. Instead, the various 
groups attempt to attain their goals through political manipulation and terrorization of the general 
population.9 New war conflicts often include tension between identities rather than ideology, 
whether ethnic, religious, or any other derivation. The shift towards new war brought about a 
change in the international security discourse, particularly considerations of non-state actors in 
security. This change included ideas of human security and “a focus on the individual and 
relations between individuals and groups within society.”10 A growing recognition of human 
security provided the space for a gendered analysis of international relations, thus the end of the 
Cold War also signaled an entry point for feminism in the study of war and conflict. By 
examining women in conflict, we gain a more nuanced understanding of what is happening and 
how conflict might affect groups differently.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Kathleen Kuehnast, Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, and Helga Hernes, Women and War: Power and Protection in the 
21st Century, Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2011: 1. 
9 Mary Kaldor, “In Defence of New Wars,” Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 2, no. 1 
(2013): 4.  
10 Ibid. 
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 The literature on women in conflict is now extensive, encompassing many viewpoints 
and issues. A key part of this field is combining women’s experiences of conflict with the 
international security agenda. On one level, this is the recognition of the basic human rights of 
women, like fair access to food, water, education, and resources and reasonable protection from 
violence.11 Further, the scholarship recognizes that the access to these basic human rights may 
differ based on gender even in the same conflict situations. Significant progress has been made in 
this recognition, particularly concerning sexual violence and rape during conflict. Before the late 
20th century, rape was regarded as a side effect of war, the result of sexually unfulfilled and lusty 
soldiers, or as an honor crime against men, implying that rape defiled women as property.12 
Offenders were not prosecuted for these crimes, and victims were largely ignored and kept silent.  
However, the civil war and breakup of the former Yugoslavia changed the conversation. 
Inger Skjelsbœk, a psychologist specializing in sexual violence during war, suggests that the 
Yugoslavian war was not the first to utilize mass sexual violence, but was the first to have such 
extensive evidence that the international community had to become involved. In this conflict, 
there was evidence of ethnically based rape on all sides: Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian.13 The 
violence was widespread; it took place in the streets and in specific rape camps that included 
forced impregnation. Here, rape was clearly utilized as a tool of ethnic cleansing; it damaged the 
morale of the community and, if a woman did become pregnant, the child would be of a mixed 
ethnicity. It is important to note that both women and men were subjected to this atrocity. As the 
evidence built, the idea of rape as a strategic tool of war caught on in the international 
conversation: various NGOs began documenting the event and the United Nations set up its own 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Kuehnast, Oudraat, and Hernes, Women and War, 2-3. 
12 Ibid, 38-39. 
13 Ibid, 66-67.	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commission to investigate the conflict.14 The Yugoslavian war also coincided with the 1994 
Rwandan genocide, in which there was also a gross amount of ethnically based sexual violence. 
Each of these events resulted in International Criminal Tribunals. 
Many NGOs and international organizations, especially Amnesty International, pushed 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to recognize rape and 
sexual violence as a war crime and crime against humanity. There was similar pressure on the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Both the ICTY and ICTR’s statutes 
specifically defined rape as an international war crime.15 The ICTY’s statue also had rule 34, 
creating a sexual violence survivors’ support group with specifically trained female staff 
facilitators provided by the court. Both the ICTY and ICTR also adopted rule 96, stating that 
sexual assault cases did not need witness corroboration and that the victim’s prior sexual history 
was not admissible in court.16 Each of these tribunals led to the Rome Statute, the treaty that 
formed the International Criminal Court (ICC) and recognizes rape, sexual slavery, forced 
prostitution, pregnancy, sterilization, and all other forms of sexual violence as crimes against 
humanity and war crimes. UNSCR 1325 drew from the experience and findings of the ICTY and 
the ICTR.  
While much of the women and conflict literature focuses on the progress and 
shortcomings of the international community on sexual violence, as mentioned above, there are 
many more ways that women may experience conflict. By focusing too much on aspects of 
sexual violence, women are incorrectly portrayed solely as victims of war. This assumption is 
certainly not the case. As part of a research project at the Netherlands Institute of International 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Kuehnast, Oudraat, and Hernes, Women and War, 72-74. 
15 Inger Skjelsbaek, “Sexual Violence and War: Mapping Out a Complex Relationship,” European Journal of 
International Relations 7, no. 2 (2001): 219. 
16 Sanam Anderlini, Women and War: Power and Protection in the 21st Century, Washington DC: United States 
Institute for Peace, 2011, 22. 
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Relations, Tsjeard Bouta and Georg Frerks identified and explicitly defined seven separate roles 
that women hold before, during, and after conflict. These included women as: victims (mostly to 
sexual violence, but also to other atrocities that occur during war), combatants, informal peace 
activists, formal peace activists, “coping and surviving actors” (meaning they adapt rapidly to the 
unfolding situation), heads of household, and agents in the informal sector.17 These roles are not 
mutually exclusive, as women may hold one or many roles throughout the conflict; their roles 
may also change as time goes on. Most importantly, such research shows that women occupy 
conflicting and often counterintuitive roles during conflict, which is quite the opposite of what 
some people expect. Women are not just victims, as they are often portrayed, but have 
opportunities to gain more agency and influence in their own lives during conflict. 
The statement above seems paradoxical – how does conflict afford women more agency? 
Multiple scholars argue that conflict is accompanied by a breakdown of socio-cultural structures, 
including traditional patriarchies and gender norms.18 As men leave to become combatants, 
social structures that normally provide the necessities of life begin to disintegrate. If there is any 
hope for survival, women must become heads of household and take on more economic 
responsibilities. Conflict necessitates women enter both informal and formal economies with 
little resistance.19 Without the pre-conflict patriarchal forces keeping women in traditional 
gender roles, women are able to work together with other women, organizing or entering 
informal politics at a local level and performing other tasks that help increase the chances of their 
families’ survival.20 Women are, therefore, adaptable and capable of successfully holding these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Tsjeard Bouta and Georg Frerks, “Women’s Roles in Conflict Prevention, Conflict Resolution, and Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction: Literature Review and Institutional Analysis,” report from Netherlands Institute of International 
Relations, published 2002, 8. 
18 Julie Arostegui, “Gender, conflict, and peace-building: how conflict can catalyse positive  
change for women,” Gender and Development 21, no. 3 (2013): 535. 
19 Ibid, 546-47. 
20 Ibid.	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roles when given the chance. Further, women do not occupy these positions only for survival, 
though this is sometimes the case. Instead, women specifically take advantage of the 
opportunities afforded to them during conflict. Julie Arostegui explains that by doing so, women 
can become self-sufficient entities, purposefully using their new agency to gain further economic 
or political power once the conflict has ended.21  
The literature clearly recognizes that women hold many complex positions during war – 
and not just as victims – but does a poor job of incorporating these insights into policy. First, 
many interventions that target women begin after the conflict has ended. This approach is 
inefficient as women navigate these difficult situations from the very beginning of the conflict.22 
When help comes only at the end of the conflict, the effort is too little and too late. The research 
recognizes that some women encounter economic and peacebuilding opportunities during the 
conflict, so policy could dictate certain interventions that help women maintain those gains in the 
long run, even before the conflict has ended. Current international policies are often shortsighted, 
but Bouta and Frerks emphasize that success requires both short and long-term goals of 
supporting local women.23 Progress could be made by increasing the number of women on the 
“professional” side of these policies, meaning individuals from international organizations, and 
by actively maintaining spaces where women can come together and express what would be 
most helpful in their own words. These forums should take place from the very beginning of 
conflict instead of waiting until the very end to build women’s communities. 
Second, women who hold the same positions as men are often ignored in terms of policy. 
This difference is most obvious when considering disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration (DDR). DDR includes removing weapons from civilians, separating military and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Arostegui, “Gender, conflict, and peacebuilding,” 547. 
22 Bouta and Frerks, “Women’s Roles in Conflict Prevention,” 42. 
23 Ibid. 
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rebel groups, providing counseling, and training former combatants to be functioning members 
of society. As mentioned, both men and women hold combat positions, but DDR largely focuses 
on accommodating men when they return from war, not women. For example, some DDR 
programs require participants to hand in a gun to be eligible for registration.24 However, female 
combatants may not have their own guns or may participate in other parts of violence that do not 
require a firearm. In this way, women can be actively, though unintentionally, excluded from the 
formal reintegration process and the economic benefits it provides. These processes often do not 
provide childcare during DDR training, so women may not physically be able to complete the 
program while also taking care of their families.25 Finally, women face additional social stigmas 
when returning from war because of the perceived nonviolence of women. By joining the fight, 
women break traditional gender roles and may find it exceptionally difficult to find jobs, 
reintegrate with family, etc. because of these traditions.26 DDR programs do not typically address 
these gendered difficulties. DDR is just one example of a policy that does not follow the example 
set by research. Research is valuable, but policies often fail to incorporate the results successfully. 
Another significant portion of the literature grapples with women in the post-conflict 
rebuilding process, primarily peacebuilding.  Some have hypothesized that women are inherently 
peaceful, thus they should be good actors for promoting peace after conflict. While we know this 
is not true, as some women both directly and indirectly support war, many scholars herald the 
importance of including women in peacebuilding. Sanam Anderlini, a prominent scholar on 
conflict resolution, suggests that most peace negotiations are modeled on those from interstate 
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war; however, intrastate war is the new reality.27 Instead, peace negotiations need to, “have 
broader goals: to end war and bring peace.”28 If the goal is to bring long-lasting, sustainable 
peace, representatives of every party affected by war must be brought to the negotiation table, 
including women. However, that is not to say that including women automatically makes the 
process easy. But, it does allow an additional fifty percent of the population to offer their 
opinions and perspective in the pursuit of peace. 
There are numerous reasons that women and gender issues are excluded from peace 
processes. First, there is a “prevailing belief that peace accords are gender neutral.”29 When 
gender neutrality is presumed, the peace process actually becomes androcentric because the 
overwhelmingly male discussants fail to consider the reconstruction process from a female 
perspective. Women have different needs and priorities in the post-conflict setting, thus it makes 
sense that their specific issues should be addressed during peace accords. Next, though women 
are often participants in the informal advocacy sphere, their grassroots efforts and groups are not 
given much legitimacy. This reaction is partially due to preconceived notions of gender roles, but 
also because women’s groups frequently shy away from entering formal political discussions. 30 
When they finally do gain access to these conversations, women’s groups often do not have 
adequate training or strategies to effectively converse and advocate for their causes. Further, 
even on the side of international interveners, very few experts and peacebuilders are women. 
However, when women are successfully integrated into peacebuilding activities, whether formal 
or informal, they are more likely to engage with their communities and promote solutions that 
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are more community oriented.31 UNSCR 1325 encourages the idea that women should be 
involved in every level of peace and security, and incorporating more women into peacebuilding 
is an essential part of this policy.   
Finally, it is important to recognize that the conversation surrounding women, peace, and 
security also includes men. As mentioned previously, women and femininity are associated with 
peacefulness while men and masculinity are associated with violence. The warrior/soldier image 
continues to be “a key symbol of masculinity.”32 This association is problematic, as it suggests 
that key traits essential in masculinity can be attained through conflict. Certain actors utilize this 
connection to perpetuate characteristics necessary for war, like a proclivity towards violence, 
toughness, and other overly aggressive behavior. Feminist scholars refer to this phenomenon as 
the militarized masculinity, the connection between military behaviors and the ideal 
masculinity.33 Most of these behaviors are reinforced through military training, which promotes 
an us versus them mentality, the military hierarchy, and the importance of the group rather than 
the individual. Military training often includes the use of gendered insults, like “whore,” “faggot,” 
“cunt,” “you woman,” and motivations that include becoming a “real” man.34 These insults 
suggest that the worst thing a soldier could be is a woman. The construction of the militarized 
masculinity takes place on individual, group, and national levels, and can even be seen in United 
Nations peacekeeping forces. Though this paper will focus on women’s experiences, it is 
important to recognize how problematic this construction of masculinity can be for women 
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during conflict. When soldiers are trained to fulfill these behaviors, there are serious 
repercussions for the women around them.  
 The path to including gender issues and women in the international political process has 
been and will continue to be difficult. As Anderlini explains, the international community is a 
complex network of organizations, bureaucracies and other players.35 Women, not traditionally 
incorporated into this realm, must learn to navigate its complexities while also making 
significant contributions to their cause. On one hand, the community seems to have the political 
will to recognize women’s issues, but has an inability to be truly effective in addressing them. 
On the other hand, there is the belief that women in politics are a panacea, a “solution to all evils” 
in the political realm.36 This is a naïve belief that, with women as an addition to leadership or 
programs, all problems will surely be solved. Here, there is gap between what women are doing 
and what the international community is doing. Each side must engage with the other to 
overcome “bureaucratic inertia,” and women must find “a permanent home” to help influence 
policy.37 There is still work to do in recognizing how gender and women may be considered in 
the field, but progress has certainly been made. This literature review highlights how academics 
have addressed these issues and what progress has been made in policy. This topic is ripe for 
analysis, thus I intend my thesis to expand on the literature in the context of the Democratic 
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The Democratic Republic of the Congo is one of the largest African states (second only 
to Algeria), nestled in Africa’s center in the Great Lakes region.  The country is home to almost 
80 million residents, 250 or more different ethnic groups, and a wide variety of languages and 
dialects.38 The DRC’s land is rich in natural resources: powerful rivers and lakes, copper, cobalt, 
diamonds, gold, petroleum and more.39 Based on the wealth of its resources and sheer size, the 
DRC should be regarded with much potential for economic and social development in central 
Africa. This potential has not been recognized, namely because of the Congo’s unstable history 
tarnished by near constant conflict and violence.  
Established as a Belgian colony in 1908, the Congo did not gain its independence from 
Belgium until 1960.40 The independent Congo was modeled on the Belgian style of government, 
with Belgian politicians approving the Congo’s new constitution and setting its first election date. 
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Patrice Lumumba won this election, though the transition to independence was not at all 
successful. After interference from various Western nations, Lumumba was assassinated in 1961, 
at which point the Congo fragmented.41 A new constitution was eventually created, the name of 
the country changed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and a new leader installed. This 
government was also short-lived, as military leader Joseph Mobutu led a coup d’état, seizing 
power and declaring himself president in November of 1965.42 Mobutu renamed the country 
Zaire and attempted to gain some political stability and legitimacy. As historian Jermaine 
McCalpin suggests, this period in the DRC’s history can be described as “ordered chaos.”43 
During his leadership, Mobutu exploited Zaire’s natural resources and gave his 
supporters political clout. Though problems persisted throughout his presidency, my focus on the 
current conflict begins in 1994 with the Rwandan genocide. During 1994, Hutu extremists in 
Rwanda killed over 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus.44 Close to two million Rwandan 
refugees flooded into the already unstable Zaire and were followed by the Hutu militants who 
had perpetrated the massacre. These groups congregated in eastern Zaire in the North and South 
Kivu regions. Mobutu’s power faltered, and a new Tutsi government emerged in Rwanda.  
In an attempt to maintain their power, the Tutsi-led Rwandan government began an anti-
Mobutu coalition that fueled local Congolese rebel groups and militias. 45  This coalition, 
eventually titled the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire 
(ADFL), gained support from the governments of Uganda, Angola, and Burundi, and rebels from 
South Sudan. The Rwandan Hutu extremists, the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du 	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Rwanda (FDLR), formed an alliance with Joseph Mobutu in response to pressure from the new 
Rwandan government. The entire country dissolved in chaos in 1996 as the Hutus and Congolese 
government fought against Congolese rebels backed by a number of other states. In 1997, the 
ADFL succeeded in overthrowing Mobutu and named Laurent-Désiré Kabila as his successor; 
Kabila quickly returned the country’s name to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.46 This 
period from the beginnings of war in late 1995 and early 1996 to the downfall of Mobutu in 1997 
is referred to as the First Congo War. 
Kabila undertook a short-lived leadership of a severely deficient country. The war 
destroyed the economy, deepened ethnic divides and tensions, and ended in no real peace 
accord. 47  The Hutu extremists of the FDLR continued killing in the DRC, and Kabila 
unsuccessfully attempted to break ties with his Rwandan backers. In short, violence continued 
even after the end of the war. As the DRC fell to chaos once again, Kabila reached out to allies in 
Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe for support. On the other side, the Rwandan, Ugandan, and 
Burundian governments instigated the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD), a 
new anti-Kabila rebel group.48 These groups began to clash and in August 1998, the RCD began 
the Second Congo War. Here, it is important to make note of a few things. First, though named 
separately, the wars occurred contiguously and may be classified as a single conflict. Second, 
despite the fact that these wars are named for the DRC, the Congo Wars included many other 
actors beyond the Congo. Some have even called this conflict the African World War. It may be 
more accurate to say these conflicts were regional in nature rather than intrastate.  
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Fighting between the various allied groups continued into 1999 while new rebel groups 
continually appeared on the scene. The RCD and the Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo 
(MLC), a rebel group launched by Uganda after a dispute with Rwanda, advanced across the 
Congo.49 The Congolese government only managed to slow these groups’ advances in mid-1999, 
at which point a stalemate developed and the international community began to organize a peace 
process. In July 1999, the Congo, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe signed the Lusaka 
Peace Agreement. The agreement established a ceasefire, provided for a small UN peacekeeping 
force (MONUC), and created a timeline for each foreign country’s withdrawal from the Congo.50 
Unfortunately, the peace accord did little to help the situation in the Congo. A limited number of 
troops did withdrawal accordingly, but the ceasefire was ignored almost entirely. 
The continued fighting came to a head in 2001 when President Laurent-Désiré Kabila 
was assassinated.51 His son, Joseph Kabila, immediately succeeded him as president and remains 
the leader of the DRC today. Laurent Kabila’s assassination acted as a catalyst towards 
completing the peace accord. By the beginning of 2002, the Angolan, Namibian, and Zambian 
troops in the Congo withdrew. After another round of peace talks hosted in South Africa and the 
resulting Pretoria and Luanda Accords, both Rwanda and Uganda withdrew as well.52 The 
Transitional Government was installed on June 30, 2003, featuring leaders from the various 
armed groups and militias. Despite the official end of the war, an enormous amount of violence 
continued through the “transition.” MONUC continued to expand and is now the largest 
peacekeeping mission ever. In 2010, the United Nations voted to rename the mission to 
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MONUSCO, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, to “reflect the new phase reached in the country.”53  
Violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo persists today. Amnesty International 
reports around twenty different armed groups operating in the DRC, though the real number may 
be significantly higher.54 Since the installation of the Transitional Government, the new national 
army, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) have become a 
strong force behind the violence. The FARDC continually clashes with local armed groups that 
have attacked both government forces and civilians. Numerous other rebel groups have played a 
role in the recent conflict, including the M23, Mai Mai, Lord’s Resistance Army, and others.55 
Another attempt at peace came in 2008 when various rebel groups met in Goma to discuss a new 
agreement; this attempt was unsuccessful as well.  
Since the official start of the conflict in 1996, there have been an estimated 5.5 million 
deaths either directly or indirectly related to the conflict.56 Further, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports over half a million Congolese refugees outside of 
the DRC and close to 1.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs).57 The conflict has been rife 
with human rights abuses, sexual violence, resource exploitation, and other atrocities perpetrated 
by all parties of the conflict. Violence continues to this day, and the Congo stands in a strange 
limbo: not officially at war, but certainly not at peace. 
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Women Before the Conflict 
“We lost our dignity. We lost our status in society.” –Mafiki Yav Marie 
 With a tumultuous history like that of the DRC, it is difficult to pinpoint a period of time 
as strictly “pre-conflict.” While there was violence and unrest before the 1994 overflow of the 
Rwandan genocide, it is helpful to bound my research so I can be as precise in my analysis as 
possible. For all intents and purposes of this project, my use of pre-conflict Democratic Republic 
of the Congo denotes the relevant time period before the official war in 1996, when the country 
was actually called Zaire. On the conflict curve mentioned in my introduction, pre-conflict is 
both the no conflict and latent conflict period. As detailed in the previous section, Mobutu Sese 
Seko held power during this time, though there was relative instability throughout the country. 
 During Mobutu’s presidency, women existed at a curious legal crossroads. The 
Constitution of Zaire guaranteed that,  
“All Zairians are equal before the law and have a right to the equal protection of the laws.
 In education, in access to public office, and in all other matters, no Zairian may be subject
 to discriminatory measures…by reason of his religion, racial or ethnic origin, sex, place
 of birth or residence.”58 
This clause grants women equal legal protection in all matters, at least establishing an important 
precedent in comparison to women under colonial rule. Though the gains were small, women 
procured some legal clout under Mobutu. In the 1980s, his government established the Ministry 
for the Advancement of Women, ratified the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (which 
prominently notes the equality between men and women), and adopted the Convention on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Zairian Constitution, accessed from https://africatoamericablog.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/drc_family_code.pdf 
and http://www.ambardcparis.com/pdf/Droit%20Civil%20et%20Judiciaire.pdf, Article 12. 
	    34 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).59 Each of these actions 
seems to suggest progress for women, though the mechanisms in place for reporting and 
upholding these standards continue to be lacking. 
 During the pre-conflict period (and still today), the Zairian government recognized both 
constitutional law and private law. There is no clarifying text that places one in precedence over 
the other, though for the average Congolese person, the Civil Code is more familiar and thus 
trumps the constitution. The distinction between the two was established during the post-colonial 
period as the new government tried to incorporate both pre-existing tribal law into the creation of 
a new constitution. Private law refers to the interactions and legal issues arising between two 
private parties and is covered by the three books of the Civil Code. The Family Code, the first 
book of the Civil Code, is the most problematic for women, though the second and third books, 
which detail property law and other obligations, are restrictive as well.60 In sum, the document 
organizes family life into a strictly patriarchal structure, placing husbands as the heads of 
household with absolute authority over both wives and children. For example, Article 712 states, 
“domestic authority over people living in a common household belongs to the one who is chief in 
virtue of the law. This authority extends over all who are part of the household,” and then later 
refers to the family chief as an unambiguous “he.”61 Though Zairian/Congolese society was 
traditionally patriarchal before and during colonialism, the additional step of codification is 
troublesome. The Civil Code also appears to be at odds with the Constitution of Zaire, which 
clearly states there can be no discriminatory measures based on sex. 
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 The Family Code goes far beyond simply establishing men as the unequivocal heads of 
household. From the beginning of the marriage, men are given the upper hand. Article 325 of the 
Family Code sets different minimum ages for marriage based on sex: men are not eligible to 
marry until age 18 under any circumstances, whereas women’s minimum age is 15 and may be 
amended to 13 in special cases.62 After the marriage occurs, women are immediately subservient 
to their husbands, as they must move in with the husband who has the sole authority to choose 
the family’s residence. All property in said residence is entrusted to the husband, regardless of 
whether it previously belonged to the wife or not.63 These unequal rules continue throughout the 
marriage. Articles 444 through 448 hint towards women’s seclusion from society, as they must 
be fully subservient to their husbands, who chose when and if they may leave the house. In any 
legal or economic matters where the woman must appear in public to represent herself, she must 
first obtain permission from her husband to represent herself and then to leave their residence.64 
If a woman is unfaithful to her husband, she must be punished in every case; if a man is 
unfaithful to his wife, he is only punishable in some cases. Finally, if a marriage is “dissolved,” a 
husband may take all property and assets and leave the woman without any support.65 Each of 
these policies is blatantly sexist and contrary to CEDAW, which Zaire ratified in 1986.   
The Civil Code had existed since the end of colonization, but Mobutu revised and 
imposed the rules of the Family Code mentioned above in 1987 when his power was slipping 
further and further away. His endeavors into private life, especially with such great intensity, 
may be seen as a last ditch effort to maintain control. The preamble of the Family Code supports 	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this hypothesis, as it explains, “family constitutes the natural base of human community…and 
must be structured to maintain and ensure its unity.”66 Later, the document explains that family is 
integral to “the authentic Zairian conception of life,” thus the government has the right to 
maintain these relationships as deemed necessary.67 Women did not respond well to the Family 
Code, with members of women’s groups lamenting, “We lost our dignity. We lost our status in 
society.”68 To maintain his status quo and the traditional society of Zaire, Mobutu found it 
necessary to restrict women. These actions were probably amplified by the growing instability in 
the region, thus propelling Zaire’s leader to the aggressive, sexist code. 
Since the end of the Cold War, Western states and international organizations have 
sought tools to predict political crises before they happen. If organizations could predict conflicts 
during the latent conflict stage, then they could enact preemptive plans to curb violence, limit 
destruction, and ultimately lessen their role in the post-conflict arena. Numerous scholars have 
researched and written on conflict early warning in recent years, and O’Brien suggests that most 
of this research has been completed to appease the needs of international organizations.69 
Researchers have taken different approaches to predict crises. For example, the United States’ 
State Failure Task Force (SFTF) has utilized measurements of a country’s level of democracy, 
trade openness, and infant mortality rate to predict historical conflicts with 66 percent 
accuracy.70 These numbers are not perfect, but help distinguish threshold numbers for each of 
these measurements that are useful in examining potential conflicts today.  
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At a basic level, conflict early warning uses systematic data collection of any number of 
variables, analysis of said variables to report on the possibility of impending conflict, and, in 
theory, these results are turned into early response when the situation warrants it.71 Essentially, 
these mechanisms seek to mitigate the time between latent conflict and conflict emergence. 
Conflict early warning is used to predict a wide range of events: “state failure, genocide and 
politicide, human rights violations, and humanitarian emergencies.”72 As it turns out, significant 
political changes, like those legal changes in the DRC, are not uncommon before conflict. These 
changes signify growing tension that, with the right catalyst, might ignite into a full-blown 
conflict. To utilize conflict early warning effectively, the indicators and reaction thresholds must 
be context specific. Understanding the underlying cultural, social, and political makeup of a 
region or country is essential to success. Furthermore, there must be an established group to 
which the results can be reported who will then take action; without a pre-established responsible 
entity, the results are an exercise in research without a relevant reaction. 
Gendered conflict early warning is a helpful subset of these indicators. Incorporating 
gender and women’s experiences into these early warning systems is significant for many 
reasons. First, as experts Susanne Schmeidl and Eugenia Piza-Lopez explain, incorporating 
gender-sensitive indicators into the collection and analysis of early warning makes existing 
models more comprehensive, and therefore a more helpful tool in predicting conflict.73 Second, 
UNSCR 1325 acknowledges that women have important roles to play throughout conflict, 
including prevention from the earliest stages of conflict. With gendered early warning, women’s 
experiences can be employed to help stop the spread of conflict, thus enriching our conflict-	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predicting abilities and giving policy makers every relevant piece of information. Finally, if 
women are not considered in the data, then their specific issues will not be addressed and the 
post-conflict situation will not better the position of women. There are many gendered early 
warning indicators, though Schmeidl and Piza-Lopez break them into four categories: 
root/systemic causes, proximate causes, gender-specific human rights violations, and abrupt 
changes in the status of women.74 I will consider both root/systemic causes and abrupt/immediate 
changes in my exploration of the situation in the DRC. 
Gender-sensitive root causes of conflict tend to focus on the pre-existing, structural 
situation of women in a country. Research shows that the levels of political, economic, and social 
equality for women are paramount for determining when violence may or may not occur. For 
example, Mary Caprioli tested a number of these variables to see if there was any correlation 
between them and states who had experienced conflict. She found that states with higher 
numbers of women in the legislature were significantly less likely to “resolve international 
disputes using military violence.”75 As far as political equality goes, the pre-conflict DRC left 
much to be desired. First and foremost, the Family Code detailed previously left women in 
entirely unequal legal, political, and social playing fields. As gender early warning theory 
suggests, the existence of the Family Code was a very strong structural indicator for conflict, 
meaning that its existence alone suggests that the society was more susceptible to violence.   
However, the Civil Code is not the only example of structural inequality. In 1979, 
nineteen years after the DRC’s independence from Belgium, there remained absolutely no 
women in government.76 I could not find the specific numbers of women participating in 
government from 1979 to 1996, though I found numerous sources that stated women made little 	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to no strides in gaining access to the political arena. As urbanization occurred and women moved 
from rural areas to the city, they did not have the necessary connections or wealth to enter into 
formal politics, as the government was incredibly corrupted under Mobutu. Even if a few women 
did break into the political sphere, there would be nowhere near the critical mass needed to see a 
significant difference in policy. 
The pre-existing social and economic conditions appear similar. One of the biggest goals 
of the post-colonial period was the improvement of the DRC’s educational system.77 Both 
Mobutu’s government and the United Nations allocated resources to meet this goal, though the 
system remained severely underfunded and understaffed. For the most part, education was not 
free, thus families would often dedicate resources to the education of their sons over their 
daughters.78 This allocation led to a premium on males’ educations, severely reducing the 
number of females in the classroom.  Several researchers note the corruption of the school 
system, especially in the 1990s; even when girls did make it to school, they might be forced into 
sexual acts or bribes to receive academic attention or advancement.79 Equal access to education 
is a cornerstone of social equality; the limited access for women is problematic. 
The Family Code also severely limited women’s opportunities to leave the home, 
affecting both their social and economic prospects. In the few years before the conflict, 
urbanization in the DRC quickened. As women made their way to the cities, they increasingly 
worked outside the home. Though economic strides were made, women remained extremely 
underrepresented in the formal sector.80 This economic inequality also stems from social 
inequality. Without an education, there is little hope for advancement in the formal sector. With 
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unofficial legal barriers to entry, finding a job is very difficult. For example, when women were 
able to get a formal job, the Family Code dictated that they must have permission from their 
husbands to work, open a bank account, etc. In other words, men would mostly control the 
money made in the formal sector, so it was more advantageous for women to work unofficially 
in informal fields.81 In both rural and urban areas, women completely dominated market trade, 
making up 70 percent or more of vendors.82 For political, social, and economic opportunities, 
most of the information available details urban rather than rural life. From the little information 
available, it appears that patriarchal tribal traditions continued in rural Congo, resulting in even 
worse situations for women. 
 Beyond the pre-existing structural limitations for women, there were also several 
immediate changes in the lead up to the 1996 conflict. Gender-sensitive immediate causes are 
indicators that, in the words of Schmeidl and Piza-Lopez, “link to human rights abuses and help 
gauge the level of tolerance in society.”83 Combined with structural inequalities like those 
discussed above, immediate changes in the status or lives of women often lead to violence and 
the breakdown of human security. As implied in Schmeidl and Piza-Lopez’s definition, some 
abrupt changes may overlap with gender-based human rights violations, particularly if they show 
a growing trend towards more gender-based violence. In the DRC, there is no shortage of either 
immediate changes or gender-based human rights violations.  
The pre-conflict situation in the DRC is particularly interesting because of its proximity 
and relation to the Rwandan genocide. In some ways, the events occurring in Rwanda were early 
warning indicators for the DRC. The invasion of Rwandan Hutu extremists that perpetrated mass 
rape, genocide, and other atrocities was one of the significant sparks for the conflict in the DRC, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Meditz and Merill, Zaire, 110. 
82 Ibid.	  
83 Schmeidl and Piza-Lopez, “Gender and Conflict Early Warning,” 12. 
	    41 
so the group’s actions elsewhere predicted the coming instability. For example, the Rwandan 
Hutus utilized the media to spread ethnic and gender-discriminatory propaganda. The group 
published the Interahamwe Ten Commandments, all of which define Tutsis as the enemy.84 
Further, the first commandment states, “Hutus must know that the Tutsi wife, wherever she may 
be, is serving the Tutsi ethnic group,” making Tutsi women surrogates for the entire ethnic 
group.85 Similar messages were spread through sexist comics published in Hutu propaganda 
newspapers. These publications created immediate changes in the status of women and, though 
they occurred in Rwanda rather than the DRC, they became indicators as soon as the Hutu rebels 
crossed the border.  
The mindset portrayed in the Hutu propaganda encouraged mass rapes and endless sexual 
violence because damage done to individual women was seen as damage done to the entire 
ethnic group. As the group moved throughout Rwanda, they also had a “scorch the earth” policy 
in which they would engage with various military groups and then leave a trail of violent 
destruction – usually including sexual violence.86 These policies immediately put women in 
danger, especially once they group entered the DRC. These policies are also another gender-
sensitive abrupt change that signaled the coming violence. Rather than attending markets and 
selling goods, women in the Congo self-imposed curfews and geographic limits that they could 
travel.87 These changes in women’s daily schedules and patterns stemmed from the risk of rape 
and other violence. Congolese women were, therefore, perceptive to their own plight and 
attempted to adjust accordingly.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 “Matrix: Early Warning Indicators of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence,” report from Secretary General’s Policy 
Committee, published December 2010. 
85 Hutu Ten Commandments, accessed online at 
http://www.uwosh.edu/faculty_staff/henson/188/rwanda_kangura_ten.html. 
86 “Matrix: Early Warning Indicators of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence.” 
87 Meditz and Merill, Zaire, 112. 
	    42 
  Furthermore, multiple sources report increased rates of domestic violence, sexual 
violence committed by and against Congolese citizens, and homophobic violence in the six 
months leading up to official start of the conflict.88 It is very difficult to quantify these kinds of 
statements – there were very few reporting mechanisms accessible to victims during this time. 
The largest increase in the rates of domestic violence occurred in rural areas, particularly those in 
the eastern part of the country (the area closest to the border with Rwanda).89 Schmeidl and Piza-
Lopez specifically mention this kind of increase in violence as an immediate indicator of coming 
violence.90 An increase in violent civilian activity can signal a demographic shift towards 
violence becoming the accepted norm. Similarly, the increase in sexual violence in the DRC 
could be associated with the emphasis on hyper-masculinity that conflict situations bring.   
 Throughout this pre-conflict period, women are agents whose experiences are often early 
warning indicators. The pre-conflict experience of women can be used to help prepare for and 
limit coming violence, but often goes ignored and underutilized. This was certainly so in the 
Congo, where numerous gendered indicators, relating to both underlying structural issues and 
immediate changes in the status of women, were present. However, no party recognized these 
indicators as they were happening, thus no one acted upon them. UNSCR 1325 reaffirms “the 
important role of women in the prevention…of conflict,” and yet the DRC is merely one 
example of the ignorance of women’s role in the pre-conflict situation.91 It would be naïve to 
suggest that recognizing gendered early warning indicators would have completely stopped the 
conflict. Still, if some observing party had first acknowledged the warning signs and, second, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 “Matrix: Early Warning Indicators of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence.”	  
89 Ibid. 
90 Schmeidl and Piza-Lopez, “Gender and Conflict Early Warning,” 14. 
91 U.N. Security Council, "Resolution 1325, Women, Peace and Security."	  
	    43 
passed the information on to a pre-established responsible actor, I contend that, at the very least, 












































	    45 
Sexual Violence in the DRC 
“The use of rape in conflict reflects the inequalities women face in their everyday lives in 
peacetime. Until governments live up to their obligations to ensure equality, and end 
discrimination against women, rape will continue to be a favorite weapon of the aggressor.” 
--Amnesty International 
If you are following along with the model of the conflict curve, the previous section 
focused on the latent conflict stage. Now, as I move onto women’s experiences with sexual 
violence, we shift into the later stages of conflict emergence, escalation, stalemate, and de-
escalation. As you can see, sexual violence has pervaded the conflict, making it difficult to tie to 
one specific point on the conflict curve. However, though sexual violence has lasted throughout 
the conflict and into the “post-conflict” period, it is helpful to discuss here because the 
experience of sexual violence has some effects on women’s roles as soldiers and peacebuilders. 
Though I am focusing on women, it is also important to note that sexual violence in the Congo, 
as it is everywhere, happens to women and men. While all sexual violence is important and 
deserves discussion, men’s experiences in the DRC fall outside the bounds of my research. 
I also want to be very specific in defining both sexual violence and rape, two terms I use 
numerous times throughout this paper. Sexual violence, as defined by the World Health 
Organization (WHO), is 
“any sexual act, attempt to obtain a sexual act, unwanted sexual comments or advances, 
or acts to traffic or otherwise directed against a person’s sexuality using coercion, by any 
person regardless of their relationship to the victim, in any setting, including but not 
limited to home and work.”92 	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This definition is quite broad, but necessarily so because sexual violence takes numerous forms. 
Rape is a more specific form of sexual violence: “the insertion, under conditions of force, 
coercion, or duress of any object, including but not limited to a penis, into a victim’s vagina or 
anus; or the insertion under conditions of force, coercion, or duress, or a penis into the mouth of 
the victim.”93 There is also much discussion about the use of the words victim and survivor in 
regards to sexual violence. Though I recognize the importance of the discussion, I will use these 
words interchangeably. I also want to offer a warning here. In this section, I utilize numerous 
stories from women in the Congo, and they are graphic. These stories are difficult to read, but I 
think it is important to highlight women’s experiences as they themselves articulate them and not 
just through statistics. 
 The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a country of almost 80 million. Of these 80 
million, approximately 2 million Congolese women report being raped in their lifetimes.94 
Between 2003 and 2006, more than 40,000 women reported rapes to the International Rescue 
Committee, and this period was after the official end of the war.95 In 2010, the UN noted that it 
had 16,000 new rape cases reported that year, with 65 percent of the victims being under the age 
of 18 and 10 percent under the age of 10.96 The statistics on sexual violence are demonstrably 
worse when comparing the eastern part of the Congo (the North and South Kivu regions) to the 
rest of the country. In a recent poll, approximately 40 percent of women living in the two 
aforementioned regions stated they had dealt with sexual violence in their lifetime.97 If you take 
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these various reports and do the math, they average to about one woman being raped per minute 
in the DRC. These statistics are why the eastern Congo is considered the rape capital of the 
world and why the Congo has been called the worst place in the world to be a woman. 
 When considering these statistics, it is important to remember that they are based on 
sexual violence that is reported, and often it is difficult for victims to access reporting 
mechanisms. Even if they do have access, many will choose not to use them so as to avoid 
reliving the experience or facing judgment from their communities. The legal system is also 
difficult to access, and that’s assuming the women can even identify their attackers. The costs are 
exorbitant to hire a lawyer to argue the case, and the legal system in the DRC is quite corrupt.98 
Women or their families often have to bribe judges just to get their cases heard at all. Similarly, 
army commanders will bribe judges and other court officials to drop cases. One survivor 
interviewed by Zihindula and Maharaj responded to the impunity in this way: “We have reported 
this matter to the local chief who told us that this was beyond his control and he may also be 
killed if trying to protect us, so now you see, when the leaders fail to protect us, how can we be 
saved? Maybe they are also part of the deal.”99 Considering these complications, the number of 
rapes committed could be, and probably is, much higher than those I mentioned.  
 There have been extreme levels of violence perpetrated by all parties of the Congolese 
conflict, and the sexual violence has been some of the most gruesome. While rape in itself is 
reprehensible, many of the soldiers and rebels have gone far beyond it to humiliate women. 
Statistics gathered by Peterman, Palermo, and Brendenkamp identify that the largest number of 
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rapes occurred in public with witnesses.100 These witnesses often include family members of the 
victims who may be forced to watch or participate in the rape. Many of these rapes are gang 
rapes, most of which are incredibly violent and cause extensive bodily harm. As one woman told 
interviewers, she was stripped naked and tied between two trees and “after the first one finished 
raping me, he called the next one to carry on. They all did the same thing until all of them were 
satisfied, while I was terrified and very exhausted after being raped by more than 10 men in less 
than an hour.”101 Those traveling in groups perpetrate most rapes, whether they are rebels or 
Congolese soldiers, and some statistics report up to 79 percent of rapes during the conflict as 
gang rapes.102 Various sources also conclude that with such high rates of gang rape, most of the 
attacks in the Congo are pre-meditated with a specific goal in mind. 
 In addition to the horrific circumstances of the sexual violence, many women experience 
torture by their attackers after the initial rape. Sometimes this torture is so extreme that it results 
in serious bodily damage or death.103 One woman told the story of her daughters attack where 
soldiers “ordered her to choose between rape and death. She chose death. So they started to 
torture her, cutting off her breasts one at a time with a knife, then her ears and then they 
completely cut open her belly…after a time, my daughter breathed her last.”104 The torture 
endured includes being beaten, genitals being mutilated or burnt, and having foreign objects 
inserted into the vagina. Objects recounted include water bottles, cans of oil, sticks, pestles 
coated in chili peppers, and barrels of guns, all of which cause serious, permanent physical 
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damage to women.105 Unfortunately, torture often goes hand in hand with sexual violence, with 
over 70 percent of those who are raped also reporting torture after the fact. It is clear to me that 
the intention is not just to take advantage of women and rape them. The purpose of this horrific 
type of sexual violence is to harm women in the most degrading, humiliating way possible.   
 The result of these experiences is immensely damaging to women. Because of the 
premium placed on female virginity and the patriarchal culture present in the DRC, rape largely 
changes women’s relationships with their communities. Women are frequently rejected by their 
communities and experience social exclusion.106 When their families and communities know 
they have been raped, women can be stigmatized as unclean, worthless, or as “asking for it,” as if 
the rape was their own fault. The community response is especially problematic, as the trauma of 
the initial sexual assault can be amplified by rejection from preexisting social groups.107 Further, 
women who are married are sometimes rejected by their husbands. The spouse may think it is the 
woman’s fault she was raped or believe that it is inappropriate for women to have sex with 
another man, even if it is forced.108 The situation is even worse for women who are not yet 
married, as men are less willing to marry someone who is not a virgin and may be afraid to have 
sexual relations. The emotional toll of the rape itself and the aftermath is incalculable. 
 The physical damage done to women is, potentially, even worse. Because of the violent 
and excessively aggressive nature of the sexual violence in the DRC, survivors are more often 
than not left with permanent physical damage. In some cases, this physical damage is purposeful 
to further humiliate women. Ohambe’s interview results showed that close to 90 percent of rape 
victims had some form of physical or reproductive health consequence because of conflict-
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related rape.109 Some of the most common physical issues are sexually transmitted diseases, 
infections (that can lead to infertility), vaginal fistulas, becoming HIV positive, and 
pregnancy.110 Because the infrastructure of the DRC has been so damaged by the conflict, it is 
difficult for women to access medical care. They must travel a great distance to hospitals and 
clinics, and even then there are few experts in women’s reproductive health.111 Instead, women 
go without treatment and struggle with health problems for the rest of their lives.  
The physical problems also have social consequences. As one victim who suffered from a 
vaginal fistula explained, 
“Since I was raped, I’ve had water permanently running down between my legs. I have 
to wear a piece of cloth that I must wash five to seven times a day and this means having 
water and soap available. Sometimes when I am in company, I see the others get up one 
after the other, or else their mood changes suddenly, they cut short the conversation and 
leave as fast as they can. Then I realise that I’ve begun to give off… and I go home to 
wash myself and to shut myself up in my hut, to hide my shame.”112 
Women already suffer from being ostracized, but the effects are multiplied when survivors have 
a serious health issue that the community cannot handle. UNSCR 1325 recognizes that women 
are specifically targeted in conflict and “calls on” member states to end sexual violence. 
However, the evidence above shows there is an important piece missing: providing adequate 
medical and psychological help for women when they do become victims. Though this is 
difficult to mandate, the United Nations should take a role in encouraging medical training for 
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women’s issues and the opening of specific wards or hospitals for survivors of this type of 
violence. 
 The stories and experiences of women in the DRC force us to ask why sexual violence 
has been so pervasive during and beyond this conflict. I will briefly describe a few explanations 
based on research by Stacy Banwell. She posits that the extreme sexual violence in the DRC is 
the result of power struggles taking place on macro, meso, and micro levels.113 The macro level 
considers the overall state of the DRC, which, during the heart of the conflict, was absolute 
chaos. This allowed multiple actors, including rebel groups, government officials, and 
corporations, to exploit the DRC’s many natural resources like gold, tin, and coltan.114 Local 
groups harvest the resources and then sell them to middlemen who pass them onto corporations 
in the West. There is, therefore, an economic incentive for all actors to perpetuate the disarray 
caused by conflict. Rape and sexual violence are particularly effective ways to maintain this 
disorder because rape “terrorizes” communities, causing them to leave their houses and land 
open for economic exploitation.115 Banwell suggests that the global hegemonic masculinity, 
which can be described as “aggressive, ruthless, and competitive,” is at play in the DRC, because 
actors will go to any lengths, including sexual violence, to make a profit.116 
 The meso level is more constrained to actors in the DRC, specifically the FARDC and the 
various rebel groups. This level recognizes the many strategic aims of individual rebel groups in 
perpetuating rape as part of their larger end goals, but takes the issue further in recognizing that 
the socialization process of militaries helps shape this behavior. Banwell describes this 
phenomenon well: “men and boys learn to be masculine and violent in the military through 	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methods specifically designed to create soldiers who are able (and willing) to fight and kill.”117 
This training creates a standard of masculinity, the soldier ideal, in which men must be able to 
protect themselves and effectively harm or kill others. The men are not supposed to feel guilt or 
any other emotion about these violent acts.  
Maria Baaz and Maria Stern completed extensive research on this topic in the DRC 
between 2006 and 2010. In their interviews, Baaz and Stern found that many of the male soldiers 
discussed the ultra-masculine ideal in the specific context of the DRC: the “provider” who is 
wealthy and has his choice of women.118 The men who join the FARDC or the rebel groups are 
typically rural, uneducated, and poor. By joining the military, they hope to gain necessary social 
and economic power. The men interviewed, therefore, viewed rape in two particular ways. The 
first was as a result of lust and frustration at their situation; this belief exemplifies the untrue 
stereotype that men cannot control their sexual urges.119 The second was as an act of the 
“emasculated man” who has not had success in other parts of the military to fulfill the masculine 
ideal. Instead, they rape or participate in rapes to help prove that they are willing to commit 
violent acts and can have control, thus fulfilling the militarized masculinity. Though this 
explanation is brief, it is important to note that the militarized masculinity is an international 
phenomenon that can lead male soldiers to extreme levels of violence to prove themselves. 
The second component of the meso level worth mentioning is the strategic aims for 
which rape is used to complete. As in the Rwandan conflict, rape in the DRC is a tool used to 
enact genocide. This conflict is a convoluted result of ethnic, political, and regional tensions, 
thus groups have tried to accomplish genocide against opposing groups. Rape is one way to do 	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this, as women’s bodies are seen as representations of the entire community.120 If women are 
violated, communities and ethnic groups are subsequently violated. Further, if the woman 
becomes pregnant from the rape, the child is not part of the community, but instead a mixture of 
the ethnicities who can never be accepted to either group. Evidence from Amnesty International 
supports these claims, as women in areas with especially great ethnic tension were targeted for 
their ethnicities.121 When women are raped, the act also targets the males of the group because 
masculinity is so caught up in men’s ability to protect their families; when they cannot do so, 
they also fail to live up to the masculine ideal. Ultimately, rape is used to terrorize men, women, 
communities, and ethnic groups – and it is quite successful at doing so. Even the perceived risk 
of such humiliation limits Congolese women’s mobility.122 Tasks like collecting firewood or 
water and going to the market become infinitely more difficult and require strategic planning. 
When women cannot complete these simple tasks, the effects flow over into their economic and 
social well being. 
The micro level of sexual violence is more localized and may or may not be directly 
related to the conflict. This sexual violence is what soldiers often called “lust rapes,” or those 
that are just opportunistic.123 In the Congo, the perpetual conflict and intense poverty have 
created “conditions where rape and sexual violence become permissible and justified within the 
conflict zone.”124 Even for non-combatants, the occurrences of gender-based violence and 
domestic violence have increased dramatically. When combatants are demobilized, they are not 
given sufficient help with reintegration; frustration with their conditions and the continued 
conflict can lead to sexual violence separate from the conflict’s strategic aims. The micro level 	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can be seen through the increases in the rates of domestic violence and violence in general. 
Furthermore, when a conflict lasts for such a long period of time, this continual state of gender-
based violence becomes an unfortunate fact of life. Essentially, the micro level takes advantage 
of the chaos of the conflict to perpetuate a gendered hierarchy that results in even more sexual 
violence separate from the conflict itself. The gender-based violence in the DRC now occurs 
from the top down and the bottom up.   
Whatever the combination of causes, sexual violence in the DRC is pervasive, perhaps 
more so than any other conflict, and women overwhelmingly occupy the role of victims. The 
international community has taken strides to combat wartime sexual abuses, but the situation in 
the DRC blatantly shows that the existing policies are not sufficient. Yes, the ICC defines rape as 
a war crime and yes, rapists can technically be prosecuted. However, successful prosecution is 
rare and is not a significant enough deterrent. Not only is sexual violence effective, but it is also 
practically risk free as it is largely met with impunity in the DRC. UNSCR 1325 “emphasizes the 
responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes including those relating to sexual and other 
violence against women and girls.”125 This recognition is important, but it is not enough. States 
cannot prosecute offenders if there is not sufficient infrastructure for fair trials, reporting 
mechanisms, help for victims to actually get to court, compensation for time lost, etc. The UN 
should do more to help establish this infrastructure so each victim has a clear way to prosecute 
her attacker, if she so pleases.  
Any further resolutions should also recognize the potential issues with the military chain 
of command – who all is responsible for sexual violence? Is it just the men who directly 
participate, or also those who knew about it or the condoning officers? This decision should be 	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clearly established. Moreover, the United Nations and other international organization must do 
more to combat the militarized masculinity. The construction of masculinity is incredibly 
important to soldiers and how they perpetrate violence, and not just in the DRC. The militarized 
masculinity is a problem for soldiers across the globe. Such a large phenomenon is difficult to 
target with a resolution, but even recognition of how the militarized masculinity affects conflicts 
would be a step in the right direction. As before, the international community has much to do in 
terms of sexual violence, especially in the DRC. 
Still, I want to end my discussion of sexual violence on a somewhat positive note. On 
New Year’s Day 2011, one group of soldiers from the FARDC entered the town of Fizi in South 
Kivu and raped at least fifty women, most likely more.126 Women were gang raped, raped in 
front of their children, and tortured. The youngest victim was only six months old. Médecins 
Sans Frontières sent a medical group to the area and reported serving over 200 people who had 
been injured in the attack. This bout of sexual violence did not go ignored. Instead, multiple 
women who were raped banded together and identified their attackers in an attempt to bring 
them to court. After the correct battalion was found, other witnesses from MSF reported that the 
leader, Lieutenant Colonel Mutuare Daniel Kibibi, ordered the attack. With this evidence, the 
national leader of the FARDC admitted that Congolese soldiers were responsible for this attack 
and “promised swift legal action.”127  
Swift legal action is exactly what happened: just over a month later, Kibibi was found 
guilty and sentenced to twenty years in prison. Three other officers also received twenty years, 
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and five soldiers were found guilty but given lesser sentences.128 In addition, the government 
paid each of the women who testified against the soldiers 10,000 USD and also required Kibibi 
to pay them for other damages. Some protestors at the funeral thought that twenty years was too 
short a sentence, and I agree. However, this example is a step in the right direction. In the DRC, 
impunity does not have to be the default. Women’s roles as victims of sexual violence can be 
mitigated, but it will take intentional effort on the part of the international community and 
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Women in Armed Groups 
“Our commander told us, ‘Do you see the old men over there? Shoot them to get rid of 
your fear.’ What should I do? I had never killed anyone before. But if you don’t obey 
orders they’ll kill you. I said a prayer ‘God, this is the work I have, the work as a soldier.’ 
We started to shoot them, shot and shot. From then on my spirit changed. The fear of 
killing went away.” – Female soldier of the FARDC 
 In a war fraught with sexual violence, it is easy to imagine the perpetrator of all violence 
as a “man in uniform” and the victims as helpless women. Nonetheless, this idea is far from true 
for the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Female soldiers have been a part of 
the army in the DRC since Mobutu began his reign in 1965, and continue to make up a 
substantial minority, potentially up to 30 percent, of armed groups in the conflict today.129 Rather 
than being passive bystanders, women actively participate in the conflict, even the most violent 
aspects. Further, the evidence suggests that most women actively and intentionally choose roles 
in armed groups, although for a variety of different reasons. When women do join armed forces, 
they also occupy a variety of positions within the group’s hierarchy. 
 For this section, I draw my information primarily from original research conducted by 
Maria Baaz, Maria Stern, Beth Verhey, and International Alert. Baaz and Stern have worked 
together on multiple projects in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and I am utilizing a 
series of interviews conducted by them between 2006 and 2011. During this time frame, they 
talked to around 250 current and ex-FARDC combatants, both men and women.130 From these 
interviews, they attempted to explain how female soldiers construct their identities as both 	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women and soldiers in comparison to traditionally male soldiers. My second source, Beth 
Verhey, worked under four different NGOs to conduct field research in the eastern Congo.131 She 
visited care centers, community centers, women’s associations, and other groups to discuss both 
women and children’s roles in the conflict. Though her visit was short, lasting only two weeks, 
she conducted twenty focus groups with over 200 interviewees. Finally, International Alert is an 
NGO that has worked with Congolese groups to help work towards a sustainable peace. In 
September 2012, the group published a report detailing its works on the ground in the eastern 
DRC.132 Their observations from direct work with armed groups is helpful as an addendum to the 
interviews conducted by Baaz, Stern, and Verhey. 
 I take the time to detail my sources on the subject because they are limited. A number of 
other academic articles and books refer to the presence of women in armed groups in the Congo, 
but have no statistics on their presence and very little other information. I searched extensively 
on the topic, mostly looking through reports from NGOs working on the ground, and found 
mentions of women combatants or women in armed groups performing other tasks, but no 
interviews or concrete data. Also, some of the literature is contradictory in its focus and 
conclusions about the role women play during conflict.133 I will point out the times when my 
sources seem to contradict each other. Most of these conclusions seem to be drawn from 
generalities, as most have never examined or interviewed Congolese women, particularly 
Congolese women soldiers. The few articles and reports detailed above are some of the only 
original research on the topic; Baaz and Stern themselves admit that the topic is grossly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Beth Verhey, “Reaching the Girls: Study on Girls Associated with Armed Forces and Groups in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo,” report for Save the Children UK, CARE, IFESH, and IRC, published November 2004, 7. 
132 “Ending the deadlock: Towards a new vision of peace in eastern DRC,” report from International Alert, 
published September 2012, 2. 
133 Emilie Combaz, “Gender dimensions of conflict drivers and stabilisation in eastern DRC,” research findings for 
GSDRC, (2013): 13. 
	    59 
“underreported” and under researched.134 I, therefore, am utilizing the best sources available, but 
recognize their limited scope and the fact that significantly more attention needs to be paid to this 
topic. 
 Women have been part of the Congolese national army, now the FARDC, for a long time. 
Mobutu, inspired by an all-female brigade of soldiers in Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya, began 
actively recruiting women in the 1980s.135 The number of women in the army grew quickly, but 
they mostly held support roles, such as intelligence work and medical assistance. After Mobutu’s 
downfall in 1997, Laurent Kabila intensified recruitment attempts for women, allowing them to 
work in direct combat roles.136 Though most statistics about women’s participation are severely 
limited and difficult to verify, one source reports that in 1998 about five percent of the national 
army consisted of women.137 For comparison, the United States had a fourteen percent women’s 
participation rate during the same time period.138 Since the “official” end of the conflict in 2002, 
the number of women in military roles has steadily decreased, now hovering around two percent 
in the FARDC. There are also significant numbers of women in the numerous armed groups in 
the DRC, though there is almost no qualitative data examining how many and in which groups. 
 Though women are ultimately a small minority of soldiers in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, there must be some significant reasons that thousands of women choose this role.  
Baaz and Stern asked this question of both the male and female FARDC soldiers they 
interviewed; the results were somewhat disparate between the sexes. First and foremost, a 
majority of the women they interviewed referred to their position in the FARDC as some 
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semblance of a “first choice.”139 Many in this majority mentioned being attracted to the armed 
forces since a young age, wanting the “dignity, order, and discipline” of the army.140 This 
description of the FARDC is in contrast to the perceived chaos of civilian life, where women 
might rely totally on their husbands or families and have few opportunities. Instead, they viewed 
the army as a way to escape this life, to regain their own agency and have a purpose. The army 
life is, to them, significantly better than their previous civilian one. Other women in the interview 
groups also noted their desires to be soldiers based on their love for their country or other 
nationalist agendas. Some knew from a young age that this was their goal in life. As one woman 
told Baaz and Stern, “I have always wanted to be a soldier. I wanted to be in combat—to fight 
and to defend my country. I liked it when I saw the parades and when I watched films of war. I 
also wanted to do that.”141 For the most part, there was a lack of victimhood in most women’s 
stories; joining the FARDC was a premeditated, purposeful choice. This feeling was quite 
opposite of the men, as most felt that they had been forced by their communities or families to 
join the FARDC. 
  Still, there were a few women who felt they had no other option but to join an armed 
group. This group ranged from being kidnapped and forced into military service to having no 
other perceivable, viable options in civilian life. One such woman was Sergeant Madot Dagbinza, 
on whom the New York Times published a striking photo essay in 2015.142 Though Dagbinza 
successfully served in one of the FARDC’s elite units for a number of years, she initially had no 
intention of joining the armed forces. When she was 16, army recruiters came to her town, where 
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she was living alone with no economic means.143 She hoped that the recruiters would take her to 
Kinshasa, where her father was supposedly living, but instead she ended up in the eastern Congo 
in an active war zone. For Dagbinza, joining the FARDC, even if under false pretenses, was a 
last resort to escape poverty. Other women felt similar ways, as if they had no other economic 
prospects, thus an armed group became the only option for survival. 
     
A few women interviewed by Baaz and Stern also regarded the armed forces as their only 
option because of their “failed femininity.”144 To these women it meant that, in civilian life, they 
could not fulfill what was expected or required of them as women. These requirements could 
refer to those as a wife or mother in any kind of capacity. To escape their own failures, they 
infiltrated one of the most masculine of worlds, the armed forces. One woman embodies this 
feeling of “failed femininity” perfectly:  	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“Me, I joined because I could not bear children. I was married first and we lived for five  
years and we didn’t conceive. My husband’s family told him to get another wife so he did. 
Then I met another man. We didn’t marry but stayed together, but also we didn’t get a 
child and he left me too. I met a third man but still didn’t have any babies so when he left 
me, I thought I might as well just join the Army.”145 
Because this woman was unable to have babies, she believed she had no purpose to serve in non-
military life. At least in the FARDC she could find a community that does not require 
childbearing to be successful. Again, at least for women in the Congolese national army, joining 
the conflict as part of an armed group is largely a preferred choice. Women who felt that the 
FARDC was their last resort were in the minority. 
 However, Beth Verhey’s findings from her interviews with rebel soldiers directly 
contradict Baaz and Stern’s findings for the FARDC. First, many of the females associated with 
the armed groups in the DRC are not actually adult women, but girls under the age of 18. The 
FARDC’s minimum age is 18, though these rules are easily flouted, as shown by Madot 
Dagbinza’s enlistment at age 16.146 Verhey found that a majority of these young women in 
armed groups are “forcibly recruited,” and that this behavior was particularly pronounced in the 
eastern provinces of the DRC.147  Furthermore, the forced recruitment for women and girls 
appeared consistent across rebel groups, which is notable considering the sheer number of groups 
operating in the Congo.  Verhey found that when women were not forcibly recruited, they still 
felt that joining an armed group was a “last resort” type choice. For example, Maria, a twelve-
year-old girl in the Eastern provinces, was not forced to join the Mai Mai, but chose to because 
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her father had died and her mother could no longer support the family.148 When considering her 
own survival, there were no other options. Beyond being forced to enlist, girls and women were 
also forced to stay; a majority of women interviewed stated they had been threatened with 
violence or death if they tried to leave.149 
 Just as women’s reasons for joining an armed group occupy a wide range, so do the roles 
women play once they have been recruited. Baaz and Stern, Verhey, and International Alert all 
note the rhetoric of women in armed groups being used solely a sexual slaves. While sexual 
slavery does happen in some cases, most women serve in roles far more integral to the survival 
of the group. I do not mean to diminish the atrocity that is sexual slavery, it certainly does 
happen in the DRC. However, I want to focus more on the other roles women play. In the armed 
rebel groups, women’s conflict related roles largely mirror and amplify their pre-existing 
peacetime activities. In the eastern Congo, women are responsible for up to 75 percent of all 
agricultural and food production needs during peacetime.150 In rebel groups, then, women make 
up a substantial portion of the group’s labor force and are responsible for growing and 
distributing food to frontline soldiers. This labor force is also assigned jobs like laundry, cleaning, 
and any other household-type chore.151 These roles are actually quite significant, as the many 
armed movements in the DRC could not survive without these simple tasks being completed. As 
Coulter suggests, women are “are essential to the functioning and maintenance of the war system 
itself.”152  
 In many of the DRC’s armed groups, women simultaneously serve in support and active 
combat roles. Maria and Salima, two girls interviewed by Beth Verhey, stated that they were 	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married off to male combatants and were required to maintain the household.153 However, both 
Maria and Salima were also required to participate on the front lines, sometimes carrying 
weapons and standing beside their male counterparts. When in active combat zones, women also 
provide male fighters with “essential logistics”; though women may not always be carrying guns, 
they are just as active and in just as much danger as men.154 The very limited quantitative data 
shows that almost all armed rebel groups utilize women in multiple roles, though the Mai Mai 
are most often cited as giving women weapons and putting them on the front lines. With this 
kind of evidence, we must recognize that the prevailing notions that women are inherently 
nonviolent and only participate in passive roles are completely untrue. 
 Women in the Congolese national army serve in a slightly different situation: the group is 
more formalized and many more women are given weapons. This difference is highlighted well 
by Madot Dagbinza, who was immediately sent to the front lines and “rarely left” during her first 
four years in the FARDC.155 Throughout their interviews with male FARDC soldiers, Baaz and 
Stern noted that women were often pigeonholed into intelligence or medical work, those being 
the jobs for which men believed women were best suited. Men also suggested that combat was a 
purely masculine activity and that women were intruding in their domain.156 It is true that many 
women in the FARDC work in intelligence, medical services, and administration, but the largest 
number are active combatants.  
For the most part, women scoffed at the perceived difference between the sexes, as 
underscored by the following conversation.  
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“Woman 1: In the Army there’s not ‘men’s’ or ‘women’s’ work. Giving punishments
 is the same. And taking punishments is the same.  
Woman 2: Carrying a gun is the same. Shooting is the same.  
Interviewer: If one talks to your male colleagues, many explain that women are not suited
 for fighting in the front lines.  
Woman 1: They are lying. Where did I come from? I just came from the front. Look at
 this wound (points at a bullet wound in the leg). I got it in an ambush. A bullet doesn’t
 care. It didn’t say, ‘you are a woman, so I will not hit you.’ It doesn’t care if you’re a
 man or a woman. A bullet doesn’t choose.”157 
Furthermore, some of the women interviewed thought that women were actually better soldiers 
than men when put on the front lines. As one woman put it, “My experience is that women are 
less afraid and thereby better, more daring and more accountable in combat. They don’t panic 
and they don’t desert you.”158 In contrast to the stereotypes surrounding women in conflict, the 
FARDC’s female soldiers do not see themselves as less violent than men, but at least as 
successful (if not more) in what they do. 
 Recognizing women’s very active roles in the Congolese conflict is important, but it also 
raises difficult questions in regards to sexual violence. The conflict in the DRC has been rife 
with sexual violence, and it is conceptually easier to imagine that women are the clear victims of 
said violence and that men are the perpetrators. This narrative is easy to understand, 
straightforward – but it is not correct. Both qualitative and quantitative evidence shows that 
women perpetrate sexual violence against men and other women. The most prominent source on 
the topic, research conducted by members of the American Medical Association (AMA), 	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concludes that women perpetrate 41.1 percent of the sexual violence committed against other 
women and 10 percent of the sexual violence committed against men.159 Curiously, very few 
men or women reported that their attackers were males and females working together. From this, 
I gather that men and women combatants must work separately, even for gang rapes, but commit 
the same kinds of sexualized violence.   
These numbers are specific to the eastern Congo, where a majority of the conflict and 
sexual violence has taken place. I will also note that there are some problems with these statistics. 
First, all of the information was self-reported by people living in North Kivu, South Kivu, and 
Ituri. The authors generalize this information to be representative of the entire eastern DRC, but 
self-reporting is not the most accurate way to gather data. Second, there were a total of 1005 
households surveyed, and they were identified from voter registrations from the year 2006.160 
Those surveyed might not be the best representation of an area that now has over 2 million 
residents as not every section of the population has access to voter registration materials. Still, 
despite these problems, this is the best information available.  
 To help clarify the data, the AMA researchers asked which armed groups each person’s 
male or female attacker aligned with. The “most frequent perpetrators” of female on female 
violence were the Mai Mai, accounting for about 27 percent of this kind of violence.161 The 
FDLR, UPC, and Interahamwe fighters were the other most reported groups. In addition, the 
AMA’s research also pinpoints the most common kinds of sexual violence (results being rape, 
gang rapes, and molestation) and the physical damage that accompanied these attacks.162 The 	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researchers themselves did not ask questions about the physical and emotional trauma specific to 
women attackers, but I must conclude that women are committing similarly aggressive, violent 
sexual assaults, just like those discussed in the previous section. This information further 
complicates the situation in the Congo, and we must consider why women commit sexual 
offenses. 
 Baaz and Stern note that some female soldiers mentioned participating in sexual violence, 
but most of their comments seemed off-handed. Soldiers commit rape, these women were 
soldiers, and thus participating was just another facet of their soldier identity.163 Baaz and Stern 
do not press the women on this issue, but I think there is more here. Though the women 
interviewed contended that they are just as capable of violence as men, the structure of armed 
groups and the FARDC makes life for women difficult. As many women hinted, “men always 
want women to be behind.”164 It makes sense, then, that women feel the need to prove 
themselves in the overtly masculine world of armed conflict. I posit that some sexual violence 
committed by women is an attempt to mitigate their femininity, proving that they are worthy to 
occupy a masculine sphere. Rape is, in some ways, the ultimate crime against women, and by 
doing so female soldiers give up their own feminine identity in exchange for the identity of a 
soldier. The strategic reasons why men rape are also probably at play with women – regardless 
of who is perpetrating the crime, sexual violence is very effective at terrorization. Overall, our 
understanding of sexual violence during conflict is messy as is, but becomes even more 
complicated when we consider women as perpetrators. 
   We have a very limited understanding of women as soldiers. However, their presence in 
the Congolese conflict proves that they must be part of the international conversation on conflict, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 Baaz and Stern, “Fearless Fighters,” 725. 
164 Ibid, 718. 
	    68 
how we construct the soldier identity, and how combatants are treated before and after conflict. 
UNSCR 1325 is actually fairly clear about female combatants: the Security Council “encourages 
all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to consider 
the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their 
dependents.”165 First, I think the recognition of the existence of female combatants is to be 
applauded. Though the resolution needs work, it does recognize that women have a role to play 
in every single portion of conflict. This recognition is helpful for all people approaching conflict, 
whether they are academics or policy makers. 
Second, UNSCR 1325 specifically mentions that female combatants may have different 
needs than males during the DDR process. Once again, this acknowledgment is huge, as some of 
the biggest dysfunctions regarding female combatants happen during the DDR process. In 2007, 
the DRC’s internal affairs minister Mbusa Nyamwisi reported that about 130,000 combatants 
had been demobilized; about 2600 of those were women.166 We know that women make up more 
than 2 percent of the armed forces, but only 2 percent of demobilized combatants were women. 
Even in the early stages, the Congo’s DDR process excludes women. This exclusion could be the 
result of problematic “one man = one weapon” rules, where combatants may only sign up for 
DDR programs if they have a weapon to trade for entry.167 This rule automatically excludes any 
women who are part of armed groups, but participate mainly in support roles. Even though they 
might not be on the front lines, they are in gross need of help reintegrating to civilian life. 
Coulter also reports that some Congolese women specifically avoid the DDR process because of 
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the possible stigmatization associated with female combatants.168 When women return from 
armed groups, there is an assumption that they have been defiled and have dishonored their 
families. By participating in a DDR program, women fear that their roles in an armed group 
become more prominent. There is both intentional and unintentional exclusion of women from 
DDR in the DRC. 
On this occasion, UNSCR 1325 does a good job recognizing how gender must be 
considered for DDR to be successful. The resolution could benefit from more specificity in 
regards to women’s different needs, thought it is certainly a good start. Most of all, UNSCR 
1325 might mention how damaging one man = one weapon rules are, as they are one of the 
biggest culprits of women’s exclusion. However, I find one problem with UNSCR 1325 that the 
consideration of female combatants highlights. Throughout the resolution, the inclusion of 
women every step of conflict is encouraged. It is implied that women’s inclusion will make the 
process better in some way, though how exactly is never specified. In some cases, like when 
discussing women in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, the resolution seems to assume the 
including women will make the process more peaceful. If women are standing by men in combat, 
fighting on the front lines, and committing egregious acts of sexual violence, there is no way we 
can assume that women are inherently peaceful. To be more accurate, UNSCR 1325 should 
specify why women should be included: because they have an important and different, though 
not necessarily more peaceful, perspective to offer. The roles of women soldiers in the DRC 
prove at least that much. 
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Women as Peacebuilding Agents 
“As mothers of the nation, you have a duty and the right to take a much stronger stand in 
pushing for the resumption of the talks. The women of Africa are behind you …do not let 
us down.” –Madame Ruth Perry 
 We are now in the final three stages of the conflict curve: negotiation, dispute settlement, 
and post-conflict peacebuilding. Despite the DRC’s “post-conflict” designation, there has never 
been any real peace in the country. A variety of actors have attempted to negotiate long-lasting 
peace agreements since the conflict’s first cooling in 1999, but none have been successful. 
Fighting has continued between rebel groups and the national army, particularly in the eastern 
Congo. In 2013, the UN created the Intervention Brigade as part of MONUSCO, the first 
peacekeeping mission ever to have military offensive authorization. The group’s offensive was 
completed by late 2013, but I question how the international community can continue to call the 
DRC “post-conflict” when peacekeepers were tasked with military aims. As it stands now, at the 
beginning of 2016, the Congo still remains in limbo, a curious state with no official war, but no 
peace either. 
 To briefly recount, the official peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
began in July 1999 with the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. The DRC, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, 
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe were all party to the accord, though it did not include any of the 
rebel groups operating within the DRC.169  The Lusaka Agreement stipulated a complete 
ceasefire, a joint UN/AU observer group to monitor the ceasefire, and the creation of the Inter-
Congolese Dialogues (ICDs). In response to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the Security 
Council mobilized 90 military observers and began preparations to deploy a full peacekeeping 	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force.170 The first Inter-Congolese Dialogue took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 2001 and 
quickly fell apart.171 The second, and much more successful, ICD took place a year later in Sun 
City, South Africa. In conjunction with these negotiations, various countries involved in the 
conflict brokered individual peace accords with the DRC. These include the Pretoria Agreement, 
signed by Rwanda and the DRC in 2002, and the Luanda Agreement between the DRC and 
Uganda.172 By the end of 2002, the parties of the conflict signed the Global and Inclusive 
Agreement, which officially ended the conflict. The agreement also set up the transitional 
government, which would be headed by President Joseph Kabila and four vice presidents chosen 
from the conflict’s armed groups.  
 As part of the country’s reunification, belligerent groups were forced to integrate with the 
FARDC. This effort caused tension between the groups, and some rebel movement refused to 
join. Violence resurfaced, especially in the eastern DRC.173 Despite the fact that none of the 
peace agreements had worked, the transitional government ended in 2006 when Joseph Kabila 
was elected president of the new DRC.  These were the first multi-party elections ever held in the 
Congo. In January 2008, the Congolese government and 22 armed groups operating in the east 
signed the Goma Peace Agreements. This agreement set in place another immediate ceasefire 
and the Amani project that would help monitor human rights law in the east.174 The ceasefire was 
ignored, and the Amani project never received adequate funding. In 2011, under very 
controversial circumstance, Kabila was once again elected president. The next national election 
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will take place late in 2016.175 Since Kabila’s re-election, there has been one more peace 
agreement: the Framework Agreement for Peace, Security and Cooperation in the DRC and the 
Region. This accord, like many of the others, has resulted in very little real change. 
 UNSCR 1325 is adamant about the need to include women in the resolution of conflict 
and in peacebuilding. The Security Council resolution mentions women’s roles in peacebuilding 
at least six times; their inclusion in the post-conflict process is clearly a priority. Beyond 
descriptive representation, UNSCR 1325 also says that the gender perspective should be a part of 
every peace process, regardless of who the involved parties are. The common narrative of the 
failed Congolese peace process does not include gender, either descriptively or substantively – so, 
where were the women?  
 In fact, women were quite involved in the Congolese peace process, though their roles are 
often ignored. Women across all ethnic identities and armed group affiliations were actually 
some of the first Congolese people to band together in hopes of ending the conflict. In 1998, an 
entire year before representatives of the government and armed groups began meeting, Femmes 
Afrique Solidarité (FAS) and Synergy Africa began to bring together women from all of the 
countries involved in the conflict.176 Congolese, Burundian, Rwandan, and Ugandan female 
delegates all attended a symposium hosted by FAS and Synergy Africa with the hopes of 
creating a network of women with different backgrounds, but a common interest. It is also 
noteworthy that this was before UNSCR 1325 existed, thus on some level there was political will 
for women’s inclusion even before the Security Council signaled its intent. Almost immediately 
after UNSCR 1325 passed, numerous women’s groups in the Congo collaborated with the 
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MONUC’s gender affairs coordinators to translate and print the resolution in four of the DRC’s 
national languages.177 The women’s groups’ hope was that women would read the resolution and 
understand that anyone could and should contribute to the Congolese peace process. 
 When it came time for the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in 1999, no women were present 
for the discussions or the signing. In the document itself, which stipulated significantly more 
than just the ceasefire, women, violence against women, and the need to stop it were never 
mentioned.178 Women’s roles as combatants were ignored completely. This exclusion, while 
frustrating, is not uncommon. When women are not included in government before war, as was 
the situation in the DRC, they are similarly excluded when it comes to the post-war situation. 
The “tense” environment of peace negotiations also tends to exclude women by adhering to 
gendered stereotypes.179 Women are not considered inherently aggressive, and the peace process 
requires aggressive negotiators who must, therefore, be men. Specifically in the Congo, leaders 
of government and other armed forces argued against women’s inclusion because they were not 
fighters in the conflict, which we know is incorrect, and therefore were not qualified to 
participate.180 I have always found this reasoning confounding. Peacebuilding is a complicated 
process that includes formal peace negotiations, but also the complete rebuilding of legal, 
economic, and social structures. I do not think that those who are qualified to wage war, men in 
this case, are the same people who are best fit to cultivate peace. Whitman put it best: “How do 
we expect to attain peace at a negotiation table surrounded by only those involved in the 
destructive, violent process of war?”181 	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    Despite being excluded from the first agreement, women were almost immediately 
mobilized in preparation for the Inter-Congolese Dialogues, the national reconciliation 
conferences mandated by the Lusaka Agreement. The ICDs were supposed to bring together 
voices from the Congolese government, the largest armed rebel groups, political opposition, and 
“forces vives,” civil society groups. Though the Lusaka Agreement was signed in 1999, the ICDs 
faced both political and economic difficulties that delayed the first attempt until 2001.182 The 
committee for the ICDs, headed by Sir Ketumile Masire, met once in Gaborone to prepare; only 
six women were included during this meeting. Because there was little economic support and 
still active violence between groups, the Addis Ababa ICD failed quickly. The committee 
decided to try again the next year. 
During these intermediary years, Congolese women became very active. The African 
Women’s Committee on Peace and Development and FAS conducted fieldwork throughout the 
two years, organizing meetings with local women in both Kinshasa and Goma.183 They wanted to 
hear about women’s conflict experiences to better represent them during the peace process. 
Women also became more engaged in civil society; by the Sun City Inter-Congolese Dialogue, 
there were over 150 new women’s groups formed in the DRC.184 After the failure of Addis 
Ababa, several of these women’s groups decided to lobby for a quota of women at the upcoming 
Sun City ICD. The Southern African Development Community had already stipulated that new 
peace processes should have at least 30 percent of the delegates be women, so Congolese women 
argued that this number should be met.185 In addition, UNIFEM, FAS, and Women as Partners 
for Peace in Africa held a large convention in Nairobi, Kenya to prepare Congolese women for 	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the ICD.186 There, women learned negotiating skills and established common goals for the ICD: 
an immediate ceasefire, women’s continued inclusion in the peace process, and recognition of 
the violence against women. These concerns were formalized in the Nairobi declaration, which 
all of the women signed.187 Just days before the Sun City dialogue, UNIFEM and ANC held 
another training session about negotiating and UNSCR 1325 for the women who would attend. 
The Sun City dialogue, which took place in April 2002, had 340 delegates divided among 
the specified groups. Only 40 of these 340 were women, making up about 10 percent of the total 
delegates – nowhere near the 30 percent quota stipulated by the Southern African Development 
Community.188 Both UNIFEM and UNDP tried to get at least 40 more female attendees, but the 
RCD began sending threats to local women’s groups contingent upon their participation in the 
ICD.189  For the 40 female participants, UNIFEM provided the funds for the entire ICD and hired 
14 consultants to assist the women throughout the negotiations. Other women’s groups, 
including UNIFEM and women from the ANC, were also able to attend the Sun City ICD, but 
were only there as silent observers. 
The dialogue itself was facilitated by Sir Ketumile Masire and had five overarching 
discussion points: defense and security, political and legal affairs, economic and financial affairs, 
peace and reconciliation, and human rights, social, and cultural issues.190 Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, 
now the President of Liberia, was the only woman on the leadership team, heading the 
conversation on human rights, social, and cultural issues. Overall, the Sun City dialogue was 
successful – the delegates signed 34 separate resolutions and each commission determined focus 	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points for the coming years. The Peace and Reconciliation Commission did recognize much of 
what UNSCR 1325 said, especially that sustainable, positive peace could not be achieved 
without women. 191 The Human Rights, Social, and Cultural Commission also recognized 
women’s roles in conflict, suggesting to the entire group that there should be significant funds 
allocated to survivors of sexual violence, specific trauma and DDR centers for female victims 
and participants of war, and that there should be a 30 percent quota for women in the new 
Congolese government. The other three commissions did not discuss women or women’s issues. 
At the very end of the ICD, when all of the delegates were supposed to sign the final agreement 
establishing the transitional government, many of the groups began getting cold feet. Instead of 
letting Sun City fall apart as Addis Ababa had, all 40 of the female delegates stood around the 
outside of the room and linked arms, thus blocking all of the exits.192 The women demanded that 
the men in the room sign the resolution – and they did.  
Women made significant contributions to the Sun City ICD, especially at the end, though 
the results could have been much better. It was difficult for women’s voices to be heard as there 
was not a critical mass of women, usually considered 30 percent, and the women who did attend 
were repeatedly told that women’s issues had no place in the peace process. It is not enough to 
have a few women attend negotiations; there must be people, women or men, willing to promote 
women’s issues. In this situation, Congolese women did not have enough male allies. Further, all 
of the female delegates were assigned to the Human Rights, Social and Cultural or Peace and 
Reconciliation commissions.193  The other three groups had a difficult time reaching consensus 
and having productive conversations; I posit that women could have ameliorated this 
environment. Though women are not inherently peaceful, research does show that women tend 	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to be more collaborative and focus on outcomes for the community rather than themselves.194 
Most of all, the participants in the Sun City dialogue did not understand one very important point: 
when peace processes are perceived as gender neutral, they almost always uphold the status quo, 
disadvantaging women, even if unintentionally. Gender-neutral peace accords are actually 
androcentric peace accords. When we ignore gender issues, there cannot be real peace. 
One of the final agreements signed, the Global and Inclusive Agreement, officially 
established the new government beginning in 2003. The transitional government had five goals: 
to reunify, pacify, reconstruct, restore territory, and reestablish state authority.195 Kabila was to 
remain the president, but he would also be assisted by four vice presidents drawn from the RDC, 
MLC, political opposition, and the current government. No women were included in this upper 
echelon of leadership, though they held 7 percent of the other national positions.196 In 2005, just 
before the first national election, women held 9 of the 61 possible minister positions (about 14 
percent), and 60 of 620 positions in parliament (9 percent). There has never been a national quota 
as suggested by the Sun City ICD. 
Since the beginning of the transitional government, women’s groups have transitioned to 
using bottom-up processes instead of integrating themselves into the convoluted top-down one. 
The top-down process is the one implemented by the government and outside forces. The new 
bottom-up process works at a grassroots levels to mobilize local people who then lobby for 
change on larger levels. Though there have been other, smaller peace negotiations, like Goma in 
2008, women have not been included in the conversations or the resolutions.197 Instead, they 
have flocked to civil society on regional, national, and local levels. FAS, one of the most active 
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women’s groups in the Congo, has created an impressive network across the country to monitor 
the implementation of UNSCR 1325. This group has also gone into difficult situations in the 
eastern DRC to engage with rebel leaders, explain UNSCR 1325, and promote small changes to 
help the situation of women.198 Other groups hold special workshops for female combatants and 
their families in hopes of easing the transition back to civilian life. Some focus on women’s 
economic setbacks, providing microloans to help women start businesses and therefore benefit 
the overall economy.199 There are more women’s groups than is possible to count, each operating 
with different goals. The UN has been quite supportive of these local women’s groups, providing 
them some funding and support from larger NGOs. These small groups are very effective on a 
local scale. 
While the international NGOs present in the DRC are helpful, it is imperative to get local 
women engaged with the process. Local civil society provides women with a community and an 
entry point into the national political process. This kind of engagement also helps unite women 
across ethnic group or any other allegiance, thus helping with reconciliation and creating a united 
front for women.200 Local civil society is also potentially more helpful than international NGOs 
because it is organic, true to the Congo. International groups are Western, and the civil society in 
the DRC will not and should not mirror civil society in the West. The next step is to truly allow 
the very grassroots civil society access to the official peace process. While civil society groups 
have been included in the past, they are mostly “elite groups” who may not fully represent the 
reality of communities.201 Grassroots civil society would also include many women’s groups that 
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have a firm grasp on women’s day-to-day experiences and what could be done to make the 
situation better.   
  Despite the long and arduous peace process, the DRC remains more or less in an 
unstable state. UNSCR 1325 is recognized in the DRC and women have played an important role 
in some of the negotiations; however, more can be done. Overall, UNSCR 1325 does a fair job of 
advocating for women’s inclusion in the peace process. The text itself mentions women’s post-
conflict roles time and time again and even “stresses the importance of their equal participation 
and full involvement in all efforts.”202 It is not enough to have one token woman in the peace 
process; women should have as much access to these negotiations as men. To be more specific, 
UNSCR 1325 could specify a goal quota, like 30 percent, for peace negotiations. A follow-up 
resolution could also emphasize the importance of including local women’s groups in equal 
capacity to armed groups. Lastly, in an ideal world, the UN would emphatically state that 
gender-neutral peace negotiations simply do not exist. We should instead strive for negotiations 
where women’s issues are deemed essential to resolving conflict.     
 Still, even with these few suggestions, UNSCR 1325 gets this topic right. However, the 
issue here is not UNSCR 1325’s will, but how it played out in reality. Both international and 
local observers attempted to apply the resolution to the situation in the DRC and promote women 
within the process. UNSCR 1325 was not the problem: its reception by actors in the DRC was. 
The bottom line is that Congolese government and armed groups lacked the political will to 
acknowledge or include women in the conversation. This is a huge problem, but one that cannot 
be fixed by the United Nations or a Security Council resolution. The international community 
can make as many suggestions as possible, but it will take a change from within the Congo itself 
to fairly include women. As it is now, the power structure in the Congo does not recognize the 	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advantages of women’s inclusion. The local women’s groups working on the ground are hoping 
to change that, and they are on the right track. I want to tread lightly here and reiterate that 
women are not a panacea for conflict. However, even if they cannot singlehandedly end violence, 
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Final Thoughts 
 At the beginning of the school year, I told the other students in my thesis workshop class 
about this project and the kinds of sources I was reading to do my initial research. I was excited 
about my prospects for the project, but all of my classmates looked at me with concern. One put 
her hand on my shoulder and said, “Megan, are you doing enough self care with this project? 
That’s going to be really important for you.” I stared at her, laughed a little internally, and then 
told my class that I would be fine and that I read things like this every day. Little did I know, that 
was actually very good advice.  
Reading and writing about war is difficult, and there were a number of times throughout 
the year that that truth hit me hard. I am normally a fairly logical person with reserved emotions, 
but this research resonated with me in a way I had never experienced before. Sometimes I had to 
quit reading sources because I could not handle the stories that women were sharing. Once, I 
read a story about sexual violence, realized that it happened in the same city where some of my 
Congolese clients were from, and then promptly began crying in the middle of the library. Other 
times, I got so frustrated with the blatant disregard for women’s experiences that I had to go on 
walks to calm down.  
The advice of self-care was more valid that I initially thought, but these moments of 
unintended emotional reaction highlight an important point. Conflict is complex and difficult to 
fully understand, but we must make an honest effort to do so. And, if we want to have the most 
nuanced, comprehensive view possible, our considerations must include the various roles of 
women. I have used the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo as a case study that 
proves this point. In the DRC, women hold many different roles, including early warning agents, 
victims of sexual violence, combatants and members of armed groups, and peacebuilders. I did 
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not explore every role that women hold in the DRC, but my sampling is enough to show that first, 
women’s roles are intricate and move far beyond just being victims of conflict, and second, an 
understanding of these roles allows us to a new level of understanding conflict. 
Throughout this paper, I have also considered United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1325 and whether is did enough in the DRC. The bottom line is that UNSCR 1325 is 
a flawed document. The resolution does note many ways in which women can be involved in 
conflict, like conflict prevention and conflict resolution; however, merely mentioning these roles 
is not enough. To be effective, the resolution cannot only recognize the importance of women; it 
must provide a path for implementation during conflict situations. Implementation was a 
significant problem in the Congo. Before the conflict, there were changes happening to women 
that, if they had been noticed and acted on, could have helped slow the conflict. Women were 
victims of egregious amounts of sexual violence. UNSCR 1325 recognized how problematic this 
was, but there was not sufficient infrastructure for holding perpetrators accountable. Women also 
attempted to be included in the peacebuilding process. The international community in particular 
advocated for women’s inclusion, but the actors in the Congo did not take the necessary strides 
to get women to the negotiation table. Yes, UNSCR 1325 could use some fine-tuning. However, 
most importantly, the international community must determine how to translate these political 
sentiments from words on a page to actual results. I do not know the best way to effect this 
change, but I do know it is necessary to fully act upon women’s conflict experiences. 
 The good news is that the international community is starting to take notice of women’s 
experiences. Research on this topic is beginning in earnest, many international organizations 
have the political will to make changes happen, and local women are becoming involved in 
activism. I can see these efforts in the DRC, and I hope that they continue to grow and that one 
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day I can genuinely contribute to them. This work is slow, but it is wildly important because 
women and their experiences are important. As this case study of the DRC has shown, 
considering women in the analysis of conflict results in a richer, more comprehensive, and 
somewhat more complex understanding of the conflict situation. By operating on this deeper 
level of analysis, we can plan better programs from conflict prevention to conflict resolution and 
understand the effects they may have on women. I am hopeful that one day this depth of analysis 
will help move the Congo from its current “no war, no peace” limbo into sustainable peace – and 
I recognize this is a lofty goal. As I have said before, I know women are not a magical cure-all 
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